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In this paper we investigate the ability of a number of different ordered probit models to
predict ratings based on firm-specific data on business and financial risks. We investigate
models which are based on momentum, drift and ageing, and compare them with
alternatives which take the initial rating of the firm and its previous actual rating into
account. Using data on US bond issuing firms, as rated by Fitch, over the years 2000
to 2007, we compare the performances of these models for predicting the ratings both
in-sample and out-of-sample using root mean squared errors, Diebold-Mariano tests of
forecast performance and contingency tables. We conclude that both initial and previous
states have a substantial influence on rating prediction.
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It is well known that ratings agencies provide inde-
pendent assessments of the risk of a counterparty using
information on the balance sheet, the profit and loss ac-
count, and private information on the management of the
entity, summarized using a rating scale which runs from
the highest rating, AAA, to the lowest, CCC. The analysis of
credit risk, the probability of default and ratings has a long
pedigree (see Horrigan, 1966; Kao & Wu, 1990; Kaplan &
Urwitz, 1979; Pinches & Mingo, 1973; Pogue & Soldofski,
1969). This body of literature seeks to explain the relation-
ship between ratings and financial or business risks, and
has investigated applications to a wide range of sovereign
countries, financial companies and corporations (Amato
& Furfine, 2004; Blume, Lim, & MacKinlay, 1998; Rösch,
2005; van Gestel et al., 2007). We expect the ratings to be
closely related to the default risk of the country or com-
pany being rated, or the instrument being issued, although
rating agencies themselves claim to rate ‘through the cy-
cle’, and seek to avoid any correlation with the business
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desirable from the points of view of long-term investors,
governments and firms, whose financing options and costs
may be affected by ratings through regulation, covenant
provisions on loans or bonds, and the reduction of access
to money and derivatives markets (see Pagratis & Stringa,
2009).
The examination of ratings behavior over time per-
formed by Blume et al. (1998) showed that credit ratings
became worse, on average, with the increased volatility
in corporate creditworthiness during the mid-1980s and
early 1990s being accompanied by downward momentum
in credit ratings. This extended the approach developed
by Carty and Fons (1993) for measuring the ratings drift.
Because firms which were initially rated as AA on the ba-
sis of their risk characteristics were subsequently rated
lower than AA, Blume et al. (1998) and others concluded
that the standards of ratings agencies became more strin-
gent over this period. However, ratings can also deterio-
rate because firms have a lower credit quality, for example
if they becoming more leveraged, and a subsequent study
by Amato and Furfine (2004) identified no secular change
in rating standards in data over the period 1984–2001.
Instead, their results implied that the ratings changes
B.V. Open access under CC BY license.
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rather than cycle-related changes to rating standards.
Cantor and Mann (2003) confirmed that rating reversals
are rare, even at a five-year horizon. At the same time,
the large number of rating downgrades during the US cor-
porate credit meltdowns in 2001–02 and 2007–09 casts
some doubt on the extent to which ratings really see
through the cycle. There are also other dynamics at work
in ratings. Carty and Fons (1993) and Lando and Skode-
berg (2002) found evidence that there is momentum in
ratings, since a firm which has previously been upgraded
has a different probability of upgrading in the next period
to a firmwhichhas previously beendowngraded. Carty and
Fons (1993) and Lando and Skodeberg (2002) also found
evidence of ageing in ratings, which occurs when the cur-
rent rating is dependent on the period of time that the firm
spent in the previous rating category. The debate over the
determinants of ratings is ongoing, and this paper com-
pares various alternative models for forecasting the cur-
rent rating classes of a number of US bond issuing firms.
Despite the many competing arguments which seek to
explain ratings, it is agreed that ratings do seem to show
state dependence. This contravenes the assumptions of
the simple stationary Markov chains which are often used
to make predictions of ratings transitions, although more
complex models involving mixtures of Markov chains
or models with non-Markovian features such as drift,
momentum and ageing can be more informative than
simple Markov models. In this paper we examine the
role of state dependence in predicting credit ratings by
first estimating the determinants of credit ratings using
linear measures of business and financial risks from the
balance sheet. We then allow for the possibility that
some variables influence the rating in a nonlinear manner,
supplementing the linear model with nonlinear terms,
following van Gestel et al. (2007). We also introduce
models of drift, momentum and ageing. Then we allow
the model to register the initial rating of the firm and
the previous actual rating of the firm, creating persistence
through state dependence (initial andprevious states). This
marks a break with previous studies, which have used
ordered probit or logit models without considering the
influence of the previous rating history on the current
rating. We show that there is a very considerable amount
of evidence that allowing for state dependence in ratings
improves the prediction of current ratings. Even by the
standards of the earliermodels,which evaluate the relative
performances of alternativemodels in terms of an informal
goodness-of-fit indicator, the performance of the model
with state dependence in predicting the current rating is
superior. When we examine the predictive ability both in-
sample and out-of-sample using the root mean squared
error with the Diebold andMariano (1995) prediction test,
and evaluate the proportion of correct predictions using
Merton’s correct prediction statistic (Merton, 1981), we
find that the state dependence model is better than the
alternatives based on this measure as well. The alternative
models which we consider include the momentum, drift
and ageing hypotheses for predicting ratings.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 discusses the extensive body of literature oncredit risk, the probability of default and ratings; Section 3
describes the methodology which we use in this paper;
Section 4 presents the data used in our empirical analysis;
and Sections 5 and 6 report the results, model predictions
and forecast evaluations. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Literature
The body of literature on credit risk and default predic-
tion, of which the analysis of credit ratings forms a part, is
vast. This literature reviewwill provide the context for our
analysis, while necessarily leaving many of the details for
the reader to follow up using the references cited. We start
with a discussion of credit risk and default probabilities,
before considering the analysis of ratings, ratings transi-
tions and the relationship between ratings and cycles.
2.1. Credit risk and the probability of default
If we suppose that the probability of default can be
connected with the characteristics (covariates) of the firm
recorded in the matrix Xit , then one approach to analyzing
the probability of default is the logit regression. Taking
yi = 1 as the default outcome observed for firm i, the
probability of default is defined as Pr(yi = 1|Xit) =
Φ(α + Xitβ) = exp(α+Xitβ)1+exp(α+Xitβ) , where α and β are matrices
of parameters to be estimated. The estimation can be
undertaken using maximum likelihood methods, where
the likelihood function is defined as
L =
N∏
i=1
Pr(yi = 1 | Xit , β, α)yi Pr(yi = 0 | Xit , β, α)1−yi .
Anderson (1984) shows that this approach is closely
connected to discriminant analysis. It is assumed that we
can observe both firms which survive (yi = 0) and
those which default (yi = 1), and can see what their
characteristics are in a training sample of data. If these
groups have different means, µ0 and µ1 respectively, a
commonvariance covariancematrix,Σ , anddensities ofφ0
andφ1 respectively, then the discriminant function d(X) =
X ′Σ−1(µ0−µ1)− 12 (µ0−µ1)′Σ−1(µ0−µ1) allocates firms
to group 0 if d(X) ≥ log K , and group 1 otherwise, based
on their information from a second sample of data. This
discriminant function ensures that the costs of allocating
the firm to the ‘wrong’ group are minimized. Anderson
(1984) shows that following this approach is equivalent to
estimating a logit regression, where we restrict Pr(yi =
1|Xit) = Φ(α + Xitβ) = exp(α+Xitβ)1+exp(α+Xitβ) , with α =
log( exp(q1)1+exp(q1) ) + (Xit −
µ0+µ1
2 )
′Σ−1(µ0 − µ1) and β =
Σ−1(µ0 − µ1). Duffie and Singleton (2003) and Lando
(2004) point out that the Z-score derived by Altman (1968)
is essentially a form of discriminant analysis, where the Xit
covariates are financial ratios from the firm’s balance sheet
recorded over time. An example of the use of discriminant
analysis for assessing the default probability is given by
Lo (1986), who found that this method was as successful
as a logit model in discriminating between bankrupt firms
in a sample of US firms. Lennox (1999) found a similar
result on a sample of 949UK firms between 1987 and 1994,
in which the covariates included firm-specific variables
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indicators such as the business cycle.
Another way in which authors have considered the
probability of default is by referring to the hazard function.
If we consider the hazard as the probability of defaulting
at time t , given that the firm has survived up to this time,
then if we think of s as a default time which has a density
function f (.) and a distribution function F(.), then the
hazard function is h(t) = f (t)1−F(t) . If the survival function has
a logistic distribution then the hazard model would result
in a logistic model of the probability of default. The most
commonly used examples of hazard models, however,
are proportional hazard models which often depend on
firm covariates. Duffie and Singleton (2003) document the
fact that a hazard function h(t) = h0(t)Γ (α + Xitβ)
has two elements, representing the baseline hazard, h0(t),
which is common to all firms, and an element Γ (α +
Xitβ) that depends on the firms’ characteristics, Xit . The
precise functional formof the baseline hazard can be either
parametric or non-parametric (see for example Lando,
2004, pp. 84–87). An example of this approach with
reference to credit risk is given by Shumway (2001),
comparing the performance of duration models with the
performances of static methods such as logit and probit
models. Using covariates identical to those of Altman
(1968), he showed that a duration model outperformed
the logit using the same information set. Chava and Jarrow
(2001) later extended Shumway’smodel to includemarket
data on capitalization, excess returns in the stock market
and the volatility of stock market returns, and further
improved on the performance of the Altman model.
Duffie and Singleton (2003) argue that the main differ-
ence between qualitative response models, discriminant
analysis, and duration models based on the hazard func-
tion, is their implied default-time densities conditioned on
the same information set, Xit . The duration models esti-
mate the probability of default over time, while the other
methods refer to the probability in a single period (or a suc-
cession of unconnected periods). Our own model makes
use of the probit estimator using the information set Xit ,
but allows for the influence of the initial state (rating) and
the previous state in various ways.
2.2. Ratings and ratings transitions
When considering a discrete ratings system, it can be
useful to make the assumption that ratings are character-
ized by Markov chains in modeling the ratings process,
even if the histories reveal non-Markov chain properties,
since the assumption provides a useful benchmark against
which to compare the actual ratings history (see Lando,
2004, pp. 88–89). If we use a discrete time Markov chain,
then the estimation of the likelihood is similar to a multi-
nominal logit estimator. The discrete model assumes that
there are i = 1, 2, . . . ,N firms in t = 1, 2, . . . , T time pe-
riods, such that ns(t) is the number of firms in state s and
ns,s−1(t) is the number of firms which transit from state s
to state s−1, and thereforeNs(T ) =∑Tt=0 ns(t) is the total
number of firms recorded at the beginning of the transition
period, and Ns,s−1(T ) =∑Tt=0 ns,s−1(t) is the total numberof firm transitions from state s to state s − 1 observed in
the entire time period. Assuming further that ratings tran-
sitions are independent across firms, and that the proba-
bility of observing a transition path from x0, x1, x2, . . . , xT
is px0,x1 , px1,x2 , . . . , pxT−1,xT (by virtue of the Markov chain
assumption), the log likelihood function is−
(s,s−1)
Ns,s−1(T ) log ps,s−1 s.t.
S−
s=1
ps,s−1 = 1,
resulting in an estimated probability of ps,s−1 = Ns,s−1(T )Ns(T ) ,
which is very similar to the multinomial logit estimate of
the transition probability.
An alternative to the stationary Markov assumption is
to assume that firms can be classified as either ‘movers’
or ‘stayers’, in line with the model of Frydman, Kallberg,
and Kao (1985). Instead of the Markov chain defining the
probability of a transition from x0, x1, x2, . . . , xT , there is
a definition px0,xT = SI + (I − S)MT , where I is the
identity matrix,M is the (K×K) transitionmatrix and S =
diag(σ1, σ2, . . . , σK ), with σi defining the proportion of
stayers in state i = s, s−1, . . . , K at time0. Some firmswill
not leave their initial state; we denote these by ni(t). The
term ni(0) refers to the number of firms initially in state
i = s, s − 1, . . . , K at time 0. There are some firms which
transit to other states ms,s−j, but some ‘movers’ end up
back where they started, ms,s. As was shown by Frydman
et al. (1985) and Lando (2004), with a large enough sample,
the proportion of movers that return to their initial state
is ms,s = Ns,s(T )−Tni(t)Ns(T )−Tni(t) , and the proportion of stayers in
each state is σi = Ns(T )ns(0) . This final term has the intuitive
interpretation of being the total number of firms recorded
as being in state s at the beginning of the transition period,
divided by the number of firms initially in state s. Frydman
et al. (1985) apply this method and the stationary Markov
chain model to 200 revolving credit accounts over the
period September 1978 to May 1981, and suggest that the
mover–stayer model has the advantage of modeling some
individual heterogeneity which improves the predictions
compared to those of the Markov chain model.
It is entirely possible to construct ratings transition
equations that depend on observed transitions as a propor-
tion of the firms in each rating category; however, this as-
sumes that the time periods are homogenous. Under this
assumption, the transitions behavior that is observed can
be used to create a generator, Λ, which will provide the
probability that a firm in rating category swill be in rating
category s − 1 at some time t , namely Πs,s−1. If the de-
fault state is s = K , thenΠs,K is the probability of default.
However, there is no reason to maintain the assumption
of time homogeneity, and Kavvathas (2001) has allowed
the generator to be a function of market data. One reason
for rejecting time homogeneity is the observation that the
probability of transition depends on the influence of the
business cycle or the age of the bond.
2.3. Ratings and cycles
If ratings vary across the cycle or depend on the age of
the bond, then the Markov chain assumptions break down
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momentum and drift. If the rating transition depends on
the period of time that the bond has been in a particular
rating category, then it is subject to ageing, as documented
by Carty and Fons (1993), Kavvathas (2001) and Lando and
Skodeberg (2002). These authors, together with Bangia,
Diebold, and Schuermann (2002) and Behar and Nagpal
(1999), also note that the rating transition depends on
the previous rating category, which suggests a momentum
effect on ratings. Empirically, this has been found to be
the case for downgrades more than for upgrades. A further
analysis of ratings over time has addressed the question of
ratings drift, which can be the result of either variations
in the standards of ratings agencies in assigning ratings or
variations in the credit quality of firms seeking ratings. The
studies of Amato and Furfine (2004), Blume et al. (1998)
and Cantor and Mann (2003) all refer to this issue. We
have noted that ratings agencies claim to ‘rate through
the cycle’, but that the existence of ageing, momentum
and drift in ratings require us to modify our Markov chain
assumption and allow for state dependence in ratings
through the inclusion of either the previous rating or
the initial rating in an ordered probit model. Nickell,
Perraudin, and Varotto (2000) introduced a business cycle
state variable (peak, normal and trough) into the covariates
driving the ratings transitions, depending on whether the
GDP growth rate was in the upper end, mid range or
lower end of the observed growth rates in the sample
period. Allowing for these influences, they found that the
transitions of US firms rated A or higher were not affected
by the cycle, but that therewas an influence of the cycle for
lower rated firms (Baa and below).
Another way of modeling the cyclical effects of the
economy on output, defaults and credit spreads was
introduced by Koopman and Lucas (2005). They model
the business cycle and the measures of actual defaults of
firms and credit spreads using an unobserved components
model along the lines of Harvey (1989), with a strong
reliance on the time series dimension of the ratings data,
in contrast to the cross-sectional properties discussed by
Bangia et al. (2002) and Nickell et al. (2000). The model
uses real chained GDP growth and the default rates of US
firms, and contains US business failure rates per 10,000
companies over the period 1927–1997, the credit spread
based on Moody’s yields on Baa corporate bonds and the
yield on government bonds with a maturity exceeding
10 years. The cyclical and irregular components of the
series are removed when the model is estimated using
a Kalman filter. Focusing on the time series properties
of their data, Koopman and Lucas (2005) found ‘strong
co-cyclicality’ between spreads and defaults and between
spreads and growth at business frequencies of 6 years,
and when they examined longer frequencies of 11 years,
there was also a significant correlation between growth
and default cycles.
In a recent paper, Frydman and Schuermann (2008) tie
Markovmodels, themover–stayermodel and the literature
on the non-Markov properties of ratings together. As
we mentioned above, the conventional time homogenous
Markov model implies that all firms with the same rating
will migrate from that rating at the same speed, but thenon-Markovian features of ageing, momentum and drift
detected in ratings do not follow this principle. However,
if the model is modified to allow firms with the same
ratings to migrate at different speeds, forming a mixture
of two time homogenous Markov chains, for example,
then these features can be accommodated in a model
with Markov properties. Frydman and Schuermann (2008)
consider a situation where there are two generators, Λ
and G,Λ = Γ G and Γ = (γ1, γ2, γ3, . . . , γK ), where
s = 1, . . . , K are the states or ratings classifications. A
proportion πs of firms with rating s migrates according to
the firstMarkov chainwith generatorΛ, and the remainder
(1 − πs) migrate according to the second Markov chain,
with generator G. The Markov chains differ in the rate at
which the firms leave state s, but each firm has the same
probability of entering another state. It is also true that
in the special case where γs = 1 for all s = 1, . . . , K ,
the model collapses to a stationary Markov model (since
Γ = (1, 1, 1, . . . , ) = IK ), and where γs = 0 for
all s = 1, . . . , K it becomes the mover–stayer model.
Frydman and Schuermann (2008) consider the predictive
ability of such a model, dependent on an information set
zt−, which includes information about the realizations of
the mixture process. Under a standard time homogenous
Markov assumption, the information set zt− would not
be relevant to predictions of either ratings or ratings
transitions, but in this mixture model, the rating history,
including the past ratings and the initial rating, as well
as the period of time in a rating state, all matter. We use
this observation to propose a number of alternativemodels
which consider the initial rating, the lagged rating and the
time within a rating state as explanatory variables for the
ordered probit model we use below. We also include firm-
specific variables to explain the rating state.
3. Methodology
In this section we explain how we use firm-specific
characteristics to predict credit ratings.1 First, we discuss
the ordered probit analysis employed in the literature
with linear and non-linear explanatory variables. Second,
we note the state dependence in ratings and ensure that
our model, which gives the probability that an issuer,
will fall into a particular rating category, accounts for
the information in the past history of ratings. Finally,
we explain how the evaluation of ratings using tests of
predictive performance can quantify the ability of our
model to predict ratings using the information in the
explanatory variables discussed above.
3.1. An ordered probit model of ratings
We begin our analysis with the standard academic
framework for relating long-term default ratings to fi-
nancial data on the balance sheet using a limited depen-
dent variable model, as used by Amato and Furfine (2004),
1 That is not to say that credit agencies use this method to generate
ratings — for a detailed statement of the process used by agencies, see van
Gestel et al. (2007, Figure 1) — but the academic literature has connected
the ratings assigned by agencies with firm characteristics using these
methods.
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and Stringa (2009) and van Gestel et al. (2007), among
others. Credit ratings can be viewed as resulting from a
continuous, unobserved creditworthiness index, y∗it . Each
rating corresponds to a specific range of the creditworthi-
ness index, with higher ratings corresponding to higher
creditworthiness values; and therefore, credit ratings are
discrete-valued indicators and have an ordinal ranking.
Following Maddala (1983), we can state that the
unobserved index of credit quality, y∗it , is defined for the
ith firm, i = 1, . . . ,N , in each time period t = 1, . . . , T .
This ordinal response can be modeled through an ordered
probit model of the following type:
y∗it = α + Xitβ + ϵit , (1)
where Xit denotes a set containing k explanatory variables
for firm i and year t, β is a k × 1 vector of unknown
parameters to be estimated, and ϵit is the disturbance
term, which is assumed to be normally distributed. The
model includes timedummies for each year to capture year
effects, and industry dummies to control for the unique
influence of factors affecting specific industrial groups.
In our data, y∗it is not observed, and thus we use the
credit ratings assigned to firms, which can take M values
for the observed variable, yit , that are assumed to be
related to the latent variable y∗it through the following
observability criterion:
yit = m if αm−1 < y∗it ≤ αm form = 1, . . . ,M, (2)
for a set of parameters α0 to αM , where α0 < α1 <
· · · < αM , α0 = −∞ and αM = ∞. Assuming a standard
normal distribution for ϵit , the conditional probabilities can
be derived as:
Pr(yit = m) = Φ(αm − Xitβ)− Φ(αm−1 − Xitβ), (3)
where Φ(.) is the standard normal distribution function.
We can evaluate the above probabilities for any combina-
tion of parameters in the vectors α and β . In our analysis
we consider a pooled probit model which does not require
strong exogeneity assumptions.
Thus, the model defines the categorical variable yit =
1, 2, . . . , 7, which is the rating assigned to each firm, and
without loss of generalitywe can recordAAAas 1, AA as 2, A
as 3, to CCC as 7.2 It connects the characteristics of the firm
recorded in the matrix Xit to the rating of the firm through
the estimated parameters, β , of the model, and the cutoff
values, α0 to αM .
The standard approach to modeling credit ratings is to
take the variables in the matrix Xit as a linear measure of
the firm-specific characteristics, as we have represented
the model above. However, recent work by van Gestel
et al. (2007) has shown that non-linear transformations
of the same firm-specific characteristics can allow for the
fact that an x% change in a variable will not necessarily
have a linear effect on the credit rating. We therefore
take a nonlinear transformation of the variables in Xit
2 In practice, we put AAA and AA together as one category, and B and
CCC together as one category, due to the small number of observations in
the highest and lowest classes.and apply the hyperbolic tangent transformation x →
f (x) = tanh(x) to limit the impact of large negative
or positive values of these ratios. These terms will be
used to determine the effect of nonlinearities in the rating
prediction function. We select the non-linear terms by
determiningwhetherwe can reject the hypothesis that the
coefficients on these terms are jointly zero, i.e., H0 : βNL =
0 in a model of the form:
Pr(yit = m) = Φ(αm − Xitβ − f (Xit)βNL)
−Φ(αm−1 − Xitβ − f (Xit)βNL), (4)
where f (Xit) is a matrix of variables transformed by the
hyperbolic tangent transformation, and βNL is the vector of
coefficients.
Other tests of momentum, ageing and drift are included
by adding as regressors:
1. A dummy variable for firms which have previously
had an upgrade and a dummy for firms which have
previously had a downgrade. If momentum effects of
the kind described by Carty and Fons (1993) are present
in our sample, the former should be insignificant and
the latter positive and significant.
2. Evidence of ageing, as measured by the number of
periods in the previous rating state, following a change
in the rating state. We expect this variable to have a
negative and significant coefficient.
3. Evidence of drift, as measured by the coefficient esti-
mates of the difference in the percentage of firms ex-
periencing an upgrade minus the percentage of firms
experiencing a downgrade for each calendar year.
3.2. An ordered probit model with state dependence
Several authors have noted that ratings do not respond
immediately to current information; for example, Odders-
White and Ready (2006) suggest that rating agencies
can be slow in responding to new information. This
may occur either for reasons which are inherent to
the rating setting process within the credit ratings
industry, or due to the rating through the cycle approach,
which attempts to separate ratings from cyclical factors.
However, when ratings are compared in successive time
periods, there is evidence of serial correlation (see Carty
& Fons, 1993; Gonzalez et al., 2004), which may reflect a
degree of temporal interdependence. Pagratis and Stringa
(2009) show that bank ratings tend to be sticky, and
therefore state dependence appears to be very important
in predicting certain types of ratings.3
As a result of these observations, we extend the model
in order to take the persistent nature of the ratings into
account. Themore general specification thatwe estimate is
derived from Greene and Hemsher (2008) andWooldridge
(2005), and includes previous rating states in our ordered
3 We do not attempt to determine the source of the persistence
in ratings, and therefore we do not offer an assessment of the serial
correlation, stickiness or staleness of ratings. Rather, our purpose is to
use the persistence to improve the forecasts of ratings assigned by credit
ratings agencies.
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can be written as:
y∗it = Xitβ + yit−1γ + yi0δ + ϵit , (5)
where Xit is a 1 × k vector containing k explanatory
variables and β is a k × 1 parameter vector. yit−1 and yi0
are indicators of the firm’s rating in the previous year and
the initial year respectively, and γ and δ are parameters
to be estimated. ϵit is the disturbance term. Assuming a
normally distributed error structure with a zero mean and
unit variance, the probability of observing the particular
category of rating m reported by firm i at time t is given
by:
Pitm = Pr(yit = m) = Φ(αm − Xitβ − yit−1γ − yi0δ)
−Φ(αm−1 − Xitβ − yit−1γ − yi0δ). (6)
The estimation of the ordered probit model with state
dependence can be performed by maximizing the log-
likelihood function using standard numerical techniques.
Since we estimate a model including lagged values, we
need to take the problem of initial conditions into account.
Thus, we estimate the model allowing for state depen-
dence and accounting for the initial conditions problem
(Heckman, 1981; Wooldridge, 2005). We adopt the pro-
cedure suggested by Wooldridge (2005) for dealing with
the problem of initial conditions. This problem is due to
the generic feature of the panel that firms (or individu-
als) inherit different unobserved and time-invariant char-
acteristics that affect the outcomes in every period. The
ordered probit models are estimated usingmaximum like-
lihood estimators that are available in standard economet-
ric software.
Themain advantage of the more general ordered probit
model is that it addresses the issue of state dependence ex-
plicitly. State dependence provides a causal link between
the probability of obtaining a rating in year t , and the re-
alization of the rating in the previous year and the initial
state. We expect to find that the fit of the model improves
with the introduction of state dependence in the rating, but
we can also allow for nonlinearities entering this model, as
we have done in earlier models:
Pitm = Pr(yit = m)
= Φ(αm − Xitβ − f (Xit)βNL − yit−1γ − yi0δ)
−Φ(αm−1 − Xitβ − f (Xit)βNL
− yit−1γ − yi0δ). (7)
We compare these models with a range of alternatives
to provide a comparison of models with different dynamic
features. These alternatives include a model which only
considers the influence of the previous rating on the
current rating, and another variant which allows for the
influence of the initial rating on the current rating. Both
of these models are linked with the work of Bangia et al.
(2002), Behar and Nagpal (1999) and Carty and Fons
(1993). We consider these models both with and without
the inclusion of firm characteristics. Another variantwhich
we consider is a model that allows for state dependence
but uses the average rating over the previous three years as
a determinant of the current rating, instead of the previous
rating. This provides us with a range of alternative models
of ratings that can be compared both in- and out-of-sample
with respect to their predictive abilities.3.3. Comparative predictive ability
The relative performances of ordered probit models
of ratings are typically evaluated in terms of an informal
goodness of fit indicator, by comparing the predicted and
observed ratings in a contingency table. Hence, Amato and
Furfine (2004) and Blume et al. (1998) report tables with
predicted ratings on the horizontal axis and actual ratings
on the vertical axis; they then comment on the numbers
of firm-year observations on the diagonal. Pagratis and
Stringa (2009) comment on the proportions of predictions
that are above, equal to, or below theMoody’s actual rating
for ratings within some range, e.g. Aaa–Aa2, Aa2–A3, etc.
van Gestel et al. (2007) compare the performance based on
the number of notches difference between the predicted
and actual ratings, irrespective of the direction.
We first report the root mean squared errors (RMSE)
of all of the competing models against the baseline
model. As a rule, models with smaller errors tend to be
superior to other competing models in regard to their
predictive ability. However, the difference between two
forecasts may not be statistically significantly different
from zero. In order to compare forecasts across all
competing models, we produce Diebold-Mariano (Diebold
& Mariano, 1995) significance levels (hereafter DM).4 This
test should provide us with information as to whether
the difference between the forecasts from two competing
models is statistically significantly different from zero. In
particular, we are able to test whether the errors of the
competing models were statistically different to those of
the baseline model. The null hypothesis of the equality
of the expected forecast performances as a function of
their errors, g(eit), is E[g(e1t) − g(e2t)] = 0. If we
define dt = g(e1t) − g(e2t), where t = 1, 2, . . . , n is
the sample mean of the series, d¯ = 1n
∑n
t=1 dt is the
natural basis for comparison in a test. The series dt is
autocorrelated, andDMshow that the variance of themean
of dt for h-step-ahead forecasts is given by V (d¯) ≈ 1n [γ0 +
2
∑h
k=1−1γk], where γk is the kth autocovariance of dt .
The Diebold-Mariano test is then S = d√
V (d)
. Under the
null hypothesis, the statistic has an asymptotic standard
normal distribution. If the calculated statistic, S, is positive
and significant, we can reject the null hypothesis that the
errors of the two forecasts are not significantly different.
As well as reporting the values of the DM statistics,
we also consider the modified version of this test statistic,
which corrects for its tendency to be over-sized, using the
adjusted DM test statistic suggested by Harvey, Leybourne,
and Newbold (1997) (hereafter HLN), which has better
small-sample properties. The values of theHLN statistic are
calculated as follows: S∗ = [ n+1−2h+n−1h(h−1)n ]
1
2 S, where S
is the original DM statistic, and n and h denote the number
of forecasts, and the forecast horizon respectively. Once
again, the test is calculated under the null hypothesis of
equivalence in forecasting accuracy, and the calculated
4 Chortareas, Jiang, and Nankervis (2011) follow a similarmethodology
for assessing the forecasting performances of several models using
exchange rate data.
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Student’s-t distribution with n− 1 degrees of freedom.
In addition to DM and HLN statistics, we use a
contingency table of actual and predicted ratings to give
a numerical assessment of predictions in- and out-of-
sample, in order to compare the alternative models. We
denote the proportion of correct predictions by SC , which
is the sumof all diagonal terms divided by the total number
of observations, SC = 1T
∑T
t=1 1(qˆt = qt), where qˆt refers
to the predicted rating and qt is the actual outcome. We
also use the Merton (1981) measure used by Henriksson
and Merton (1981), Chavapatrakul, Kim, and Mizen (2008)
and Pesaran and Timmermann (1994), which modifies
the SC measure in order to avoid good predictions from
the ‘stopped clock’ problem. Let CP j be the proportion of
correct predictions made by qˆt when the true state is given
by qt = j. From the definition of conditional probability,
CP is computed as
CP j =
1
T
T∑
t=1
1(qˆt = j)(qt = j)
1
T
T∑
t=1
1(qt = j)
and Merton’s correct measure, denoted CP , is given by
CP = 1J−1 [
∑J−1
j=0 CP j − 1], where J is the number of
categories, and − 1J−1 ≤ CP ≤ 1. In the contingency
table, CP is the unweighted average of CP js minus one
(to correct for the stopped clock phenomenon). The CP js
are calculated as the proportion of correct predictions
divided by the total of each row. Thismodifies themeasure
of predictive ability to discount the influence of the
dominant outcome. Only when a predictor is accurate for
all categories will it obtain a high CP score.
4. Data
4.1. Data sources
We use Fitch’s database as our source of data on issuer
default ratings.5 This database provides information on the
long-term ratings assigned to each issuer, as well as the
date when the rating became available, and thus we have
a continuous rating history for each firm. In keeping with
the normal practice in the literature, we categorize our
firms into rating categories without considering notches
(i.e., + or −). Amato and Furfine (2004) emphasize that
this categorization considers large cumulative changes of
ratings rather than small movements notch by notch, and
avoids the generation of rating categories with very few
observations.We consider seven rating categories, ranging
from AAA to CCC, which are assigned numerical values,
starting with 1 to AAA, 2 to AA, through to 7 to CCC.
Following Calomiris, Himmelberg, andWachtel (1995), we
group AAA and AA together, creating a ‘super-investment
grade’ category, and we group the CCC and B ratings
together similarly. This allows for the fact that there are
5 Fitch ratings have been generally available since 1995 and can be
downloaded from either Fitch’s website or other commercial databases
such as Bloomberg. Firm-level data from Fitch’s Peer Analysis Tool are
available from 2000 onwards.only a few AAA and CCC ratings. Table 1 reports the ratings
distribution of the firms in our sample. We can see that
the number of observations increases over time and that
our sample is dominated mainly by observations with A
and BBB ratings. This information can be used to compare
the predicted ratings from the static model with the actual
ratings, and the lagged and initial values can be used as
inputs to the model with state dependence, before making
a similar comparison between the predicted and the actual
ratings.
We use Fitch’s Peer Analysis Tool to extract firm-
level accounting data. Corporate historical data for all
firms rated by Fitch are available from 2000 onwards.
Following selection criteria which are commonly used in
the literature, we exclude companies which do not have
complete records of our explanatory variables, or firm-
years with negative sales and profits. To control for the
potential influence of outliers, we exclude observations in
the 0.5% upper and lower tails of the distribution of the
regression variables.
Our combined sample contains data for 273 firm-
years, yielding a total of 1845 annual observations. The
firms in our sample operated actively between 2000
and 2007 in a variety of sectors such as manufacturing,
utilities, resources, services and financial services. The
panel has an unbalanced structure, with the number
of observations on each firm varying between two and
eight. Our sample has two characteristics that make it
especially appealing for our analysis. First, it includes
both investment grade and high yield bonds, where
previous studies have mainly restricted their attention
to investment grade bonds, neglecting the effects of
speculative grade bonds.6 This is particularly beneficial
because firmswithhigh yield bond issues aremore likely to
be characterized by adverse financial attributes and weak
balance sheets, and hence, such firms may be subject to
more intensive monitoring. Second, the sample spans a
wide range of sectors of the US economy. We use data for
five industries: manufacturing, utilities, mining, services
and financial services. This classification corresponds to
the sectoral breakdown of the entire US economy using the
Datastream level 3 sector indices, constructed according
to the 1999 FTSE reclassification. Ratings vary based
on an industry’s fundamentals; industries which are in
decline, highly competitive, capital intensive, cyclical or
volatile are inherently riskier than stable industries with
few competitors, high barriers to entry, national rather
than international competition, and predictable demand
levels. Therefore, an issuer in a high-risk industry is
unlikely to receive the highest rating possible (AAA),
despite having a conservative financial profile. We include
industry dummies to allow for this feature of the data.
The distribution over the spectrum of ratings AAA–CCC
in each year is reported in Table 1. There is some variation
between years, but the proportion of firms in each rating
category seems to be quite stable. However, that does not
imply that there are no transitions between categories.
6 Rösch (2005) and vanGestel et al. (2007) are exceptions in this regard.
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Ratings per year.
AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC Observations
2000 2 8 40 72 34 34 4 194
2001 2 7 51 85 40 37 4 226
2002 2 7 55 83 44 33 7 231
2003 2 7 53 83 46 45 7 243
2004 1 7 53 92 48 51 6 258
2005 1 7 54 88 47 46 6 249
2006 1 7 55 86 42 37 4 232
2007 1 7 42 80 42 37 3 212
Observations 12 57 403 669 343 320 41 1845
Notes: The table presents the distribution of firms’ ratings by year, based on a panel of firms from 2000 to 2007.Table 2
Correlation matrix for ratings and firm-specific creditworthiness indicators.
RATING PROF CF LIQ LEV COV SOLV SIZE
RATING 1.00
PROF −0.23 1.00
CF −0.43 0.04 1.00
LIQ −0.21 −0.01 0.21 1.00
LEV 0.55 0.04 −0.28 −0.35 1.00
COV −0.56 0.42 0.56 0.29 −0.46 1.00
SOLV −0.44 0.18 0.32 0.33 −0.75 0.42 1.00
SIZE −0.43 0.12 −0.19 0.07 −0.46 0.31 0.14 1.00
Notes: The table presents correlations. PROF= Earnings before interest and taxes over total sales; CF= Funds
from operations to total assets; LIQ = Cash from operations to total liabilities; COV = Operating profits
to interest expenses; LEV = Total debt over total assets; SOLV = Common equity over total assets; and
SIZE= Log of real total sales.Table 3
Correlation matrix for lagged and initial ratings.
AAA–AA_1 A_1 BBB_1 BB_1 B–CC_1 AAA–AA(1) A(1) BBB(1) BB(1) B–CC(1)
AAA–AA_1 1.00
A_1 −0.10 1.00
BBB_1 −0.14 −0.38 1.00
BB_1 −0.09 −0.25 −0.35 1.00
B–CC_1 −0.09 −0.25 −0.35 −0.24 1.00
AAA–AA(1) 0.85 −0.06 −0.11 −0.10 −0.10 1.00
A(1) −0.05 0.93 −0.36 −0.24 −0.24 −0.10 1.00
BBB(1) −0.13 −0.35 0.95 −0.34 −0.35 −0.15 −0.36 1.00
BB(1) −0.09 −0.22 −0.32 0.90 −0.23 −0.10 −0.24 −0.33 1.00
B–CC(1) −0.09 −0.25 −0.35 −0.15 0.90 −0.10 −0.24 −0.35 −0.23 1.00
Notes: The table presents correlations. The one period lags of the ratings are reported as AAA–AA_1, etc. The initial period
observations are reported as AAA–AA(1), etc.4.2. Firm-specific characteristics
Rating agencies use both qualitative and quantitative
analyses to assess the business and financial risks of fixed-
income issuers (see Fitch, 2006; van Gestel et al., 2007). In
our empirical model we follow both the ratings agencies’
practice and the recent literature (e.g. Amato & Furfine,
2004; van Gestel et al., 2007) in measuring these risks
using explanatory variables such as profitability, cash flow,
liquidity, financial leverage, performance, solvency, and
size.
The first two measures are based on earnings. The first
is a measure of earnings before interest and taxes over the
total sales (PROF), which is a measure of the profitability
of the firm, while the second is a measure of the resources
the firm is able to generate from its operations relative
to its total assets, which is also known as the cash flow(CF). A higher profitability and a greater cash flow improve
the credit rating. The liquidity variable (LIQ) indicates
the cash from operations relative to liabilities, and also
improves the credit rating if it increases. The next two
measures indicate the scale of the firm’s liabilities, namely
the leverage (LEV), defined as total debts over total assets,
which indicates the overall indebtedness of the firm, and
the interest coverage ratio (COV), as measured by earnings
before interest and taxes to interest paid, which assesses
the firm’s net indebtedness and the cost of debt servicing.
A higher leverage implies a weaker balance sheet, and
therefore we expect this measure to have an adverse
effect on credit ratings, but a higher coverage indicates the
opposite. The solvency ratio (SOLV)measures the common
equity to total asset ratio. An increase in this variable
improves the credit rating. Finally, the real total sales
(SIZE) indicates the scale of the firm, and higher values
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Summary statistics.
Mean 25% Median 75%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PROF
AAA–AA 18.69 11.58 19.85 24.15
A 14.08 8.16 11.69 18.40
BBB 11.06 5.96 9.77 14.48
BB 11.21 4.11 10.11 14.48
B–CC 8.48 2.91 7.18 13.03
Total 11.55 5.45 10.16 16.01
CF
AAA–AA 16.67 13.89 17.29 20.01
A 12.07 8.91 11.66 15.11
BBB 10.67 7.15 10.27 13.75
BB 9.69 6.03 8.63 12.63
B–CC 6.84 3.70 6.05 9.45
Total 10.29 6.35 9.82 9.45
LIQ
AAA–AA 21.82 7.33 14.57 32.58
A 13.28 3.38 8.38 16.42
BBB 12.85 2.86 6.91 15.50
BB 9.86 2.15 5.11 11.94
B–CC 8.67 1.20 4.03 11.05
Total 11.92 2.47 6.48 14.88
LEV
AAA–AA 18.34 10.18 15.29 24.52
A 25.18 16.81 23.34 31.91
BBB 26.85 18.34 26.32 34.36
BB 36.90 25.13 34.55 46.21
B–CC 46.44 30.03 44.01 56.37
Total 31.84 19.50 28.75 40.77
COV
AAA–AA 13.81 9.72 12.81 16.36
A 7.52 4.67 6.54 8.82
BBB 5.63 3.49 4.66 6.52
BB 4.08 2.61 3.49 4.41
B–CC 3.22 1.70 2.21 4.34
Total 5.61 2.97 4.44 6.91
SOLV
AAA–AA 43.39 39.33 45.92 51.71
A 36.89 28.35 38.25 45.98
BBB 37.77 29.36 38.12 46.39
BB 29.25 21.03 32.30 41.02
B–CC 21.92 9.98 21.84 37.77
Total 33.12 23.55 35.65 44.32
SIZE
AAA–AA 10.55 10.01 10.43 10.94
A 9.52 8.37 9.04 9.86
BBB 9.11 8.37 9.04 9.86
BB 8.56 7.94 8.48 9.31
B–CC 8.47 7.79 8.51 9.20
Total 9.03 8.28 8.99 9.81
Notes: The table presents percentiles of the distributions for each of
the following variables: PROF = Earnings before interest and taxes over
total sales; CF = Funds from operations to total assets; LIQ = Cash
from operations to total liabilities; COV = Operating profits to interest
expenses; LEV = Total debt over total assets; SOLV = Common equity
over total assets; and SIZE= Log of real total sales.
would be expected to improve the rating. To make our
results comparable with previous studies, we take three-
year averages. Since this takes into account the previous
financial conditions of the firms that are being rated, notjust the present conditions, it builds some persistence
into the firm-specific characteristics, and should allow our
models to replicate some features of credit ratings ‘through
the cycle’.
Table 2 provides a correlation matrix for the firm
characteristics and the rating of the firm. It demonstrates
that the characteristics have relatively low correlations
with each other. In addition, the negative correlation
between the credit ratings and profitability, cash flow,
liquidity, coverage, solvency and size reflect the tendency
for firms to obtain better ratingswhen they display healthy
balance sheets. The positive correlation between credit
ratings and leverage shows that highly indebted firms tend
to attract worse ratings. This confirms that ratings are
correlated with the indicators of creditworthiness on the
balance sheet that investors expect ratings to measure.
Table 3 provides correlation information for lagged
categories of ratings and initial ratings. There is some ev-
idence that lagged and initial ratings in the same cate-
gory are positively correlated, presumably because there
are firms which do not make a transition from their ini-
tial rating. This high correlation could potentially result in
multicolinearity in the equations where lagged and initial
ratings are included together, and therefore, in order to
avoid drawing all of our conclusions from models where
this could be the case, we compare several different speci-
fications in our results where lagged and initial ratings are
included separately.
Table 4 reports summary statistics of our explanatory
variables. We observe that firms belonging to the invest-
ment grade spectrum (BBB and above) have higher profit
margins and cash flow values, are more liquid and less
leveraged, have higher coverage ratios, are more solvent,
and are larger than high yield firms (below BBB).
5. Results
In this section we report the estimation results.
5.1. The linear probit model
The first column of Table 5 reports our baseline model,
which we refer to as model 1. Later, we will compare the
performances of other models against this baseline. The
results show that, with the exception of the measure of
leverage, an increase in any of the linear terms in the firm-
specific variables improves the credit rating (they have
significant negative coefficients which predict a better
rating categorywith a lower number). As profitability, cash
flow, interest coverage, liquidity and solvency improve,
and as the firm has higher total sales, so the firm receives
a better predicted rating, as expected. Leverage has a
positive effect, worsening the credit rating, also as we
might expect. Model 1 has an R2 of 0.26.
5.2. The non-linear probit model
The results for the nonlinear model (model 2) of van
Gestel et al. (2007) are presented in the second column of
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Prediction of corporate default ratings.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PROF −0.027*** −0.022*** −0.022*** −0.023*** −0.022***
(−5.72) (−4.36) (−4.41) (−4.58) (−4.36)
CF −0.027*** −0.014** −0.014* −0.015** −0.014**
(−3.80) (−1.98) (−1.87) (−1.99) (−1.98)
LIQ −0.008*** −0.008*** −0.008*** −0.007*** −0.008***
(−3.22) (−2.93) (−2.94) (−2.79) (−2.93)
LEV 0.020*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016***
(6.28) (4.56) (4.52) (4.64) (4.56)
COV −0.054*** −0.064*** −0.064*** −0.062*** −0.064***
(−4.39) (−5.23) (−5.27) (−5.13) (−5.23)
SOLV −0.006** −0.005** −0.006** −0.005* −0.005**
(−2.43) (−1.99) (−2.03) (−1.96) (−1.99)
SIZE −0.553*** −0.531*** −0.534*** −0.534*** −0.531***
(−16.53) (−15.61) (−15.70) (−15.79) (−15.61)
NLCOV −6.281*** −6.266*** −6.027*** −6.281***
(−5.34) (−5.28) (−5.13) (−5.34)
NLLIQ −0.849*** −0.855*** −0.854*** −0.849***
(−4.91) (−4.94) (−5.02) (−4.91)
PREV UPGR −0.314
(−0.74)
PREV DNGR 0.632**
(2.17)
AGEING −0.078**
(−1.98)
DRIFT2002 −0.029
(−0.24)
DRIFT2003 0.147*
(1.74)
DRIFT2004 0.290***
(2.91)
DRIFT2005 0.321***
(2.75)
DRIFT2006 0.464***
(3.95)
DRIFT2007 0.482***
(4.06)
Observations 1842 1842 1842 1842 1842
R2 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27
Notes: The table presents ordered probit estimation results. The left-hand-side variable is the credit rating of
a firm. In the analysis, AAA–AA ratings are assigned a ‘1’, A ratings a ‘2’, and so on to the CC ratings, which are
assigned a ‘5’. The one period lags of the ratings are reported as AAA–AA_1, etc. The initial period observations
are reported as AAA–AA(1), etc. Time and industry dummies were included in all specifications. Robust z-
statistics are reported in parentheses.
* Indicates significance at the 10% level.
** Indicates significance at the 5% level.
*** Indicates significance at the 1% level.Table 5. The nonlinear terms apply the hyperbolic tangent
transformation to variables to limit the impact of large
negative or positive values of the variables on the predicted
rating. We first check whether the nonlinear terms are
significant by determining whether the coefficients can
be restricted to zero. The non-linear transformations
of coverage (NLCOV) and liquidity (NLLIQ) reject this
hypothesis with a p-value of 0.92 for the joint hypothesis
that the coefficients are zero. The nonlinear model has
similar signs and significance levels of the linear terms for
coverage and liquidity. The nonlinear terms are strongly
significant and have negative coefficients, while the linear
terms retain their signs and significance. The effect of
the nonlinear terms raises the R2 from 0.26 to 0.27. This
indicates that minor improvements in the fit of the model
can be achieved with the addition of nonlinear terms, butthe predictions of ratings reported later show a greater
improvement.
5.3. Momentum, ageing and drift
Columns 3–5 in Table 5 indicate the importance of
momentum (model 3), ageing (model 4) and drift (model
5), as described earlier in the paper. Carty and Fons (1993)
were the first authors to note that a firm’s rating depended
on whether the firm had previously been upgraded
or downgraded. They concluded that firms which had
been downgraded were more likely to see subsequent
downgrades, while firms which had been upgraded were
not more likely to be upgraded. The results in column
3 uphold these findings. The dummy variable indicating
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signed coefficient, but one which is not significantly
different from zero, while a dummy variable indicating
firms which have previously been downgraded has a
significant positively signed coefficient. Thus, there seems
to be some evidence of momentum along the lines of Carty
and Fons (1993) in our sample. There is also evidence
of ageing. When we allow for the number of periods
in the previous rating state, following a change in the
rating state, we find that this variable has a negative and
significant coefficient (reported in column 4 of Table 5).
This means that the rating improves with the length of
time in the previous rating state, which confirms the
evidence of ageing identified by Carty and Fons (1993),
Kavvathas (2001) and Lando and Skodeberg (2002). Finally,
we consider evidence of drift, which can be a result of
either variations in the standards of ratings agencies in
assigning ratings or variations over time in the credit
quality of firms seeking ratings (see Amato& Furfine, 2004;
Blume et al., 1998; Cantor & Mann, 2003). We report
the coefficient on the difference between the percentage
of firms experiencing an upgrade and the percentage of
firms experiencing a downgrade in each calendar year.
We find that the estimated coefficients are significant for
all but 2002, and all significant variables are positive and
increasing in magnitude, implying that there is a tendency
for ratings to worsen over time. This supports the findings
of Blume et al. (1998), but it is not clear whether this is
due to stricter ratings by agencies, or a deterioration in the
credit quality of the firms being rated. Despite the strong
evidence in favor of momentum, ageing and drift, we find
that it adds almost nothing to the goodness-of-fit of these
rating probit models.
5.4. Allowing for state dependence in ratings
Bangia et al. (2002), Behar and Nagpal (1999), Kav-
vathas (2001) and Lando and Skodeberg (2002) note that
the rating transition depends on the previous rating cat-
egory. We now introduce initial and lagged values of the
rating for each firm in order to allow for state dependence
and initial conditions in the results reported in Table 6. In
columns one and two (models 6 and 7) we report the re-
sults of the probitmodel whenwe allow for lagged and ini-
tial ratings separately and without other variables present,
then in column three we report the impact of including
both lagged and initial ratings in the model, with no other
variables in the equation (model 8). Then, in columns 4–6,
we report the impact of including firm-specific variables
(models 9–11). Finally, we report the results of a model
where we allow for the average rating over the past three
years, instead of the rating in the previous period (model
12). This provides a range of results which allows us to de-
termine the relative importance of lagged and initial rating
data, providing evidence of a certain type of momentum in
models of ratings. All of the models include some element
of state dependence, and it remains to be seen whether
these models improve on the predictions of the models in
Table 5.
The findings in these columns show that the previous
or initial ratings are significant predictors of the currentrating in nearly every case. A positive and significant
coefficient on the lagged rating (relative to the baseline
rating of A) means that firms with this rating in the
previous period are predicted to have a ratingwith a higher
ordinal value than A this period. (Recall that higher ordinal
values are associated with lower ratings.) The opposite is
true for negative coefficients. Thus, firms with AAA–AA
ratings in the previous period(s) are predicted to have
ratings above A, and firms with BBB ratings or below in
the previous period(s) are predicted to have ratings below
A. Because the numbers for firms with AAA–AA ratings
are larger negative numbers than those with A ratings,
they will have correspondingly lower predicted ratings,
i.e. ratings which are higher on the rating scale.
We compare these models with two models that allow
for state dependence in the ratings, one based on first
lagged and initial ratings and an average of lagged ratings
over the previous three years, and the other on the initial
rating. The estimates are similar to those reported in the
previous columns in the following respects. We observe
that both linear and nonlinear variables retain their signs
and significance in most cases. The variables are not as
strongly significant as they were in the other models,
which suggests that some of their significance in the
previous model was a result of state dependence in the
ratings, which is now measured by the lagged and initial
ratings directly. Nevertheless, the linear and nonlinear
terms do not lose all of their significance in every case,
and we retain these variables in our model. We also find
that the lagged dependent variables — included in order to
test formally for state dependence— are highly statistically
significant. We therefore conclude that the previous state
matters for the prediction of the rating today, and if a
firm was rated below investment grade at time t − 1,
it is predicted to remain in the high-yield spectrum in
the current period; similarly, being rated as investment
grade in the previous period increases the probability of
being rated as an investment grade issuer in the current
year. As we will see later, this prediction is almost always
correct. When we consider the effect of the average rating
in periods t−1, t−2 and t−3 in place of the lagged rating,
we find a similar result.
The coefficients of the lagged and average ratings show
a similar gradient in the magnitude of the coefficient
as one moves from a previous rating status of CC to
AAA–AA. Embedding this state dependence through the
previous rating or the average rating of the three previous
years substantially improves the fit of the model. Thus,
firms with AAA–AA ratings in the previous period(s) are
predicted to have ratings above A, and firms with BBB
ratings or below in the previous period(s) are predicted
to have ratings below A. The estimated coefficients for
the initial period observations are also highly significant.
They showcharacteristicswhich are similar to the previous
period rating for firmswith initial ratings aboveA, since the
coefficients are negative, and are larger negative numbers
as the initial rating improves. Below A, firms with BB
and B–CC initial ratings have worse predicted ratings than
those with initial A ratings, while BBB rated firms appear
to have better predicted ratings.
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State dependence and initial ratings.
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PROF −0.005 −0.015∗∗∗ −0.019∗ 0.013
(−0.66) (−3.30) (−1.87) (1.25)
CF 0.013 −0.033∗∗∗ −0.013 −0.062∗∗∗
(0.65) (−5.07) (−0.96) (−3.62)
LIQ −0.007∗∗ −0.006∗∗ −0.008∗∗ −0.002
(−2.04) (−2.41) (−2.00) (−0.45)
LEV 0.018∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(2.92) (3.33) (2.44) (3.63)
COV −0.060∗∗∗ −0.017 −0.019 0.016
(−3.30) (−1.46) (−0.92) (0.63)
SOLV 0.003 0.000 0.005 0.003
(0.64) (0.13) (1.04) (0.41)
SIZE −0.073 −0.385∗∗∗ −0.234∗∗∗ −0.253∗∗∗
(−0.99) (−8.71) (−3.47) (−3.16)
NLCOV −7.338∗∗∗ −6.144∗∗ −5.987∗ −4.320∗
(−2.62) (−2.16) (−1.76) (−1.83)
NLLIQ 0.037 −0.507∗∗ −0.369 −0.604
(0.25) (−2.29) (−1.60) (−1.48)
AAA–AA_1 −10.150∗∗∗ −9.554∗∗∗ −10.023∗∗∗ −9.561∗∗∗
(−21.91) (−37.31) (−30.13) (−37.00)
BBB_1 3.922∗∗∗ 5.227∗∗∗ 3.921∗∗∗ 5.586∗∗∗
(9.51) (6.03) (9.42) (6.83)
BB_1 7.761∗∗∗ 5.285∗∗∗ 7.693∗∗∗ 5.250∗∗∗
(9.84) (5.15) (9.79) (5.28)
B–CC_1 18.357∗∗∗ 19.594∗∗∗ 18.527∗∗∗ 20.153∗∗∗
(21.90) (11.36) (19.12) (11.31)
AAA–AA(1) −2.627∗∗∗ −1.310 −2.238∗∗∗ −1.470∗ 1.788∗
(−7.32) (−1.58) (−5.98) (−1.95) (1.77)
BBB(1) 1.957∗∗∗ −0.625 1.899∗∗∗ −0.964∗ 0.700
(12.80) (−0.94) (12.77) (−1.74) (1.21)
BB(1) 3.974∗∗∗ 3.777∗∗∗ 3.780∗∗∗ 3.868∗∗∗ 4.589∗∗∗
(14.44) (4.00) (13.96) (4.07) (7.36)
B–CC(1) 6.926∗∗∗ 6.887∗∗∗ 6.926∗∗∗ 7.290∗∗∗ 6.282∗∗∗
(18.89) (4.00) (19.26) (3.99) (5.84)
AVER.AAA–AA_1 −7.053∗∗∗
(−6.62)
AVER.BBB_1 4.392∗∗∗
(7.98)
AVER.BB_1 5.375∗∗∗
(7.47)
AVER.B–CC_1 14.023∗∗∗
(13.34)
Observations 1842 1842 1842 1688 1842 1688 1688
R2 0.90 0.63 0.92 0.91 0.68 0.94 0.93
Notes: See the notes to Table 5.Models with state dependence have higher R2 values
than models without state dependence, but we now com-
pare the predictive performances in- and out-of-sample
using rootmean squared errors, Diebold-Mariano statistics
and in contingency tables.
6. Predictions
6.1. In-sample predictions
We begin by evaluating the forecasts of the models
presented in Table 5. In columns one to three of Table 7,
we report root mean squared errors (RMSE) and values
for the Diebold-Mariano and Harvey-Leybourne-Newbold
statistics, compared to those of the baseline model (model
1) in Table 5. The results suggest that model 3 has the
smallest RMSEs, and there is evidence of a statisticallysignificant difference between model 1, which is the
baseline model, and models 2, 3, 4 and 5. According to the
DM and HLN tests, only models 2 and 3 have a predictive
ability superior to that of the linear baseline model. In
columns one to three of Table 8 we give the RMSEs
and values of the DM and HLN statistics for the models
presented in Table 6. On the basis of the above mentioned
statistics, there is a significant difference between the
performances of the baseline model and all other models.
Thus, all of the models reported in Table 6 (except model
6) perform better than the baselinemodel. Themodel with
state dependence (model 11) displays the smallest RMSE,
and is significantly superior to the baseline model.
For the model with the smallest RMSE (model 11, with
state dependence, as shown in Table 6), we present a
contingency table where one can compare the predicted
and actual ratings. The outcome of this exercise is shown
in Table 9. Reading across each row gives the number
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Root mean squared errors, Diebold-Mariano and Harvey-Leybourne-Newbold tests for comparing the
predictive accuracy of the models presented in Table 5.
In-sample Out-of-sample
RMSE DM HLN RMSE DM HLN
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Model 1 0.051 – – 0.041 – –
Model 2 0.047 3.56*** 2.90** 0.033 1.75* 1.29
Model 3 0.044 14.22*** 11.60*** 0.031 6.76*** 5.52***
Model 4 0.065 −7.39*** −6.03*** 0.057 −3.50*** −2.86**
Model 5 0.092 −5.52*** −4.50*** 0.103 −4.22*** −3.48***
Notes: The table reports root mean squared errors and values of the DM and HLN statistics.
* Indicates significance at the 10% level.
** Indicates significance at the 5% level.
*** Indicates significance at the 1% level.Table 8
Root mean squared errors, Diebold-Mariano and Harvey-Leybourne-Newbold tests for comparing the
predictive accuracy of the models presented in Table 6.
In-sample Out-of-sample
RMSE DM HLN RMSE DM HLN
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Model 6 0.413 −2.13** −1.74* 0.044 −0.27 −0.22
Model 7 0.043 10.26*** 8.37*** 0.040 0.15 0.12
Model 8 0.034 12.13*** 9.89*** 0.036 2.14** 1.75*
Model 9 0.037 10.50*** 8.57*** 0.036 1.98** 1.61
Model 10 0.036 7.24*** 5.91*** 0.034 1.86* 1.52
Model 11 0.033 12.34*** 10.06*** 0.030 3.09*** 2.47**
Model 12 0.034 13.97*** 10.80*** 0.033 2.11** 1.72*
Notes: The table reports root mean squared errors and values of the DM and HLN statistics.
* Indicates significance at the 10% level.
** Indicates significance at the 5% level.
*** Indicates significance at the 1% level.Table 9
In-sample predictions—model with state-dependence.
Actual rating Predicted rating
AAA–AA A BBB BB B–CC Total
AAA–AA 62 0 0 0 0 62
A 2 394 7 0 0 403
BBB 0 1 586 3 0 590
BB 0 0 2 306 1 309
B–CC 0 0 1 2 318 321
Total 64 395 596 311 319 1685
SC = 0.98, CP = 0.97
Notes: The table reports in-sample predictions. The leftmost column shows the actual ratings,
while the columns on the right show the predictions of the model with state-dependence.of predicted observations per category against the actual
outcome in the leftmost column. For example, the first row
shows the number of observations with actual ratings of
AAA–AA, while the second row shows those with ratings
of A, etc. To evaluate the predictive ability of our model
correctly, we employ two different statistics, SC and CP .
The model correctly predicts AAA–AA 62 times, A 394
times, BBB 586 times, BB 306 times and B–CC 318 times.
The correct prediction is made 1666 times, and hence
we find that SC = 1666/1685, which suggests that
approximately 98% of predictions are correct. The outcome
of this exercise needs to account for the influence of
the dominant outcome by reporting the Merton correct
predictions statistic. This test calculates correct predictions
using the proportion of correct predictions for each of the
five rating categories. This test produces CP = 0.97 forthe model with state dependence. Comparing this result
with other authors’ results, we find that the Blume et al.
(1998) ordered probit model for bond issuers from 1978
to 1995 had scores of SC = 0.57 and CP = 0.30, while
Amato and Furfine (2004) had similar scores of SC = 0.52
and CP = 0.26 for the model of bond issuing forms for
data from 1984 to 2001 with time dummies included. The
main conclusion that can be drawn from this exercise is
that credit ratings are indeed highly autocorrelated, and
previous years’ ratings are a key variable when predicting
current ratings in-sample.
6.2. Out-of-sample predictions
This section presents out-of-sample predictions of
ratings using the past and current information available up
286 P. Mizen, S. Tsoukas / International Journal of Forecasting 28 (2012) 273–287Table 10
Out-of-sample predictions—model with state-dependence.
Actual rating Predicted rating
AAA–AA A BBB BB B–CC Total
AAA–AA 32 0 0 0 0 32
A 1 179 24 0 0 204
BBB 0 1 329 12 0 342
BB 0 0 2 170 8 180
B–CC 0 0 1 5 181 188
Total 33 200 345 181 187 946
SC = 0.94, CP = 0.93
Notes: The table reports out-of-sample predictions. The leftmost column shows the actual
ratings, while the columns on the right show the predictions of the model with state-
dependence.to time T . We use an expanding window method, which
allows the successive observations to be included in the
initial sample prior to producing the next one-step-ahead
prediction of the rating, while keeping the start date of the
sample fixed. By this method, we forecast future ratings
qˆt+1, qˆt+2, etc. The initial estimationwindow is 2000–2004
and the first prediction date is the year 2005. We then
increase T by one each time, until T reaches the year 2007.
Columns 4–6 of Table 7 report the RMSEs and DM
and HLN statistic values for the models in Table 5. We
are able to reject the null hypothesis of equal forecasting
performance for all four models. Specifically, models 2
and 3 are significantly better than the baseline model in
terms of forecasting ratings. Table 8 reports the relative
performance using the RMSE, DM and HLN statistics to
compare the models in Table 6 with the baseline model.
We identify evidence of a significant difference between
the baseline model and the competingmodels in five cases
out of seven. Once again, themodel with state dependence
(model 11) displays the highest DM statistic value and the
lowest RMSE.7
Table 10 provides the contingency table of the predicted
versus actual outcome out-of-sample results for themodel
with state dependence. As with the in-sample results,
the predictive ability of the out-of-sample predictions is
upheldwhen lagged values of the ratings and initial ratings
are included, since SC = 0.94 and the Merton correct
prediction statistic indicates CP = 0.93. The prediction
out-of-sample is remarkably good, and shows that state
dependence is a feature of ratings that helps in forecasting.
7. Conclusion
Manymodels of the relationship between credit ratings
and a firm’s financial characteristics have used a linear
probit model. In this paper we introduce nonlinear terms
and allow the ratings to vary due to ageing, momentum
and drift. We then introduce state dependence in the
form of lagged and initial ratings. The resulting model
shows that non-linearities and state dependence terms
improve the fit of a model seeking to determine a firm’s
7 We have also compared the model with state dependence with all
other competingmodels. According to both theDMandHLN statistics, the
modelwith state dependence is significantly better in terms of forecasting
ratings.credit rating. When we analyze the ability of such a model
to predict ratings, we find that the model with non-
linearities and state dependence predictsmuch better than
the baseline linear probit model both in-sample and out-
of-sample. It appears that allowing for state dependence
offers greater gains than allowing for non-linearities alone
(although these offer some improvement in prediction),
offering an SC score that is correct 98% of the time, and
a CP score which is correct 97% of the time. The state-
dependent model has the best performance, as evaluated
by the Diebold-Mariano statistic. When we compare the
performance of the model with state dependence out-of-
sample, we find that its performance does not deteriorate
very much. It is correct 94% of the time on a SC basis,
and 93% of the time on a CP basis out-of-sample, allowing
for predictions one year ahead for the years 2005–2007;
once again, thismodel is superior according to theDiebold-
Mariano statistic. We conclude that the use of information
on the initial condition of the rating of the firm and the
last observation of its actual rating helps the model to
predict the rating correctlymore often than amodel which
excludes this information.
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